Do labor market programs affect labor force participation? by Johansson, Kerstin
WORKING PAPER 2002:3
Do labor market programs affect
labor force participation?
Kerstin JohanssonIFAU – Do labor market programs affect labor force participation?  1








January 30, 2002  
 
Abstract 
This paper estimates the macroeconomic effect of labor market programs on 
labor force participation. Labor market programs could counteract business-
cycle variation in the participation rate that is due to the discouraged-worker ef-
fect, and they could prevent labor force outflow. An equation that determines 
the participation rate is estimated using panel data (1986-1998) for Sweden’s 
municipalities. The results indicate that labor market programs have relatively 
large and positive effects on labor force participation. If the number of partici-
pants in labor market programs increases temporarily by 100, the labor force 
increases by around 63 persons. The effect is temporary so the number of par-
ticipants in the labor force returns to the old level in the next period. If the 
number of participants in programs is permanently increased, the labor force 
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increases by around 70 persons. The results indicate that programs prevent la-
bor force outflow because participants who would have left the labor force in 
the absence of programs are now participating because of the programs. In-
come and vacancies have positive long- and short-run effects on participation 
rate. Open unemployment, job destruction rate, and proportion of persons be-




Keywords: labor supply, labor market programs, dynamic panel data 
JEL code: E64, J68, J22 
 IFAU – Do labor market programs affect labor force participation?  3




2 The theoretical background...............................................................................7 
3 Data.................................................................................................................11 
3.1 The data set ...........................................................................................11 
3.2 Definition of variables ..........................................................................12 
4 Empirical results..............................................................................................13 
4.1 Estimation results..................................................................................15 
4.2 Comparison with other studies..............................................................19 
5 Discussion of the results..................................................................................20 
 IFAU – Do labor market programs affect labor force participation?   4IFAU – Do labor market programs affect labor force participation?  5
1 Introduction 
Sweden’s labor force participation rate (number of persons in the labor force 
relative to the number of persons in the working-age population) decreased 
sharply in the 1990s, from on average 84% during the late 1980s to 79% in the 
1990s. This decrease in participation rate occurred while the unemployment 
rate, measured in terms of the working-age population, increased from on aver-
age 2% to almost 6%. A large increase in the number of persons participating 
in labor market programs paralleled the rise in unemployment. The number of 
participants in labor market programs in relation to the working-age population 
rose from about 1% in the late 1980s to more than 3% in the 1990s.  
Part of the large increase in labor market programs has been evaluated; see 
the Calmfors, Forslund and Hemström (2002) overview. Often, it is difficult to 
find positive effects from vocational training on the participant’s probability of 
getting a job. Positive effects are found for some job creation programs, while 
displacement effects from these programs are large. Results from studies of 
macroeconomic effects of labor market programs on Sweden’s labor market 
indicate that labor market programs affect labor demand. For example, Dahl-
berg and Forslund (1999) find significant direct displacement effects on regular 
employment from use of labor market programs. The results in Forslund and 
Kolm (2000) indicate that the number of labor market programs participants 
does not affect wage setting. This study focuses on effects of programs on labor 
supply. This question has been more important the recent years, when labor 
shortage has been a problem – and not high unemployment as in the early 
1990s. One potential positive effect of labor market programs is that they could 
prevent labor force outflow, which could be important because Sweden’s labor 
force is expected to decrease because of the demographic structure.  
Labor market programs may affect labor force participation in several ways: 
(1) programs could affect income of the unemployed. For some programs, pro-
gram participants are paid more than the unemployment benefits; (2) programs 
could result in a higher job-offer probability, by, for example, affecting partici-
pants’ qualifications and thus increasing future income; (3) programs have been 
used to qualify for new periods of unemployment benefits. Taken together, 
programs could increase labor force participation, because they directly or indi-
rectly could increase income and thus the value of labor force participation. 
Labor market programs have been used extensively in Sweden, so their effect 
on participation could be non-negligible.  IFAU – Do labor market programs affect labor force participation?   6
Labor force participation data have a clear pattern, where changes in the 
participation rate are strongly and positively correlated with changes in em-
ployment, which indicates strong business-cycle variation in the participation 
rate. Flows between nonparticipation and employment are also procyclical. 
Business-cycle variation in real wages in Sweden is relatively small, so shocks 
to real wages could not be the only explanation behind procyclical movements 
of the participation rate. The discouraged-worker effect is a candidate for ex-
plaining business-cycle fluctuation in the participation rate. According to the 
discouraged-worker effect, the participation rate will decrease when it is diffi-
cult to get a job and increase when it is easy to find a job so that people move 
in and out of the labor force – depending on the state of the business cycle. La-
bor market programs can reduce variation in the labor force participation that is 
due to the discouraged-worker effect because programs are typically counter-
cyclical. And if an unemployment shock lasts for a long time, the risk of mar-
ginalization of dropouts could be severe, and labor market programs could have 
potentially important effects if they prevent labor force dropout. 
Empirical studies indicate that the discouraged-worker effect is present. The 
effect of labor market programs on labor force participation has not been stud-
ied internationally, but some attempts were made on Swedish data. Using 
Swedish time series data (1964-1992), Wadensjö (1993) finds that the change 
in unemployment and the proportion of the labor force that is participating in 
labor market programs affect the change in the labor force participation. Labor 
market programs have a positive effect and unemployment has a negative ef-
fect on labor force participation. He concludes that more studies must be done 
because the estimated sizes of the effects are sensitive to the specification and 
to the included trend term in the equation. Using Swedish time series data 
(1970-1992), Johansson and Markowski (1995) estimate an equation for labor 
force participation rate with the change in regular employment and the change 
in labor market programs – divided by the change in the working-age popula-
tion. Both employment and labor market programs have a positive effect on la-
bor force participation. Dahlberg and Forslund (1999) estimate the direct dis-
placement effect of labor market programs in Sweden, and their results indicate 
that labor market programs are increasing labor force participation, because the 
estimated displacement effect is larger when employment is divided by labor 
force than when divided by the population. Taken together, empirical results on 
Swedish data indicate that the state of the business cycle and labor market pro-




This paper estimates the macroeconomic effect of labor market programs on 
labor force participation. Theoretically, we would expect that labor market pro-
grams affect labor force participation. Swedish empirical results, regarding the 
effect of labor market programs on labor force participation, are either obtained 
indirectly, as in Dahlberg and Forslund (1999), or obtained using time series 
data. In this study, the focus is on effects on the participation rate during the 
extreme labor market situation in the 1990s. The data set is richer than those 
used by Johansson and Markowski (1995) and Wadensjö (1993), and instru-
ment variables are used in the estimation.  
If the discouraged-worker effect is present, then effects on unemployment, 
wages and prices, for example, affect the macroeconomic outcome. Because 
Sweden expects a decrease in the labor force for demographic reasons, the fu-
ture labor supply situation could be less severe if programs are found to have 
positive effects on the labor force. Because labor market programs were used 
extensively in Sweden, the potential effect could be non-negligible.  
The rest of the paper is organized like this: Section 2 presents the theoretical 
background for the estimations. Section 3 contains a description of the data, 
and Section 4 contains the estimation results. Section 5 presents a discussion of 




2 The theoretical background 
This section presents the theoretical background for how the labor force par-
ticipation decision is determined. In the empirical analysis, the theoretical im-
plications are used to suggest which variables to include in the estimation and 
to determine the theoretical effects on participation rate. The labor force is the 
sum of regular employment, open unemployment, and the number of partici-
pants in labor market programs. The participation rate is the number of persons 
in the labor force – divided by the number of persons in the working-age popu-
lation. Johansson (2001) presents a formal description of the theoretical model. 
The model is based on Holmlund and Lindén (1993) and Calmfors and Lang IFAU – Do labor market programs affect labor force participation?   8
(1995), and extended with endogenously determined labor force participation, 
as in Pissarides (1990).  
Individuals compare the value of nonparticipation with the value of labor 
force participation – when deciding whether or not to participate in the labor 
force. The value of nonparticipation consists, for example, of the value of lei-
sure, the value of education, or the values of other activities in which nonpar-
ticipants are engaged. For example, age, number of children, and supply of 
day-care services could affect the value of nonparticipation. Nonparticipants 
decide to participate in the labor force if the value of participation is greater 
than the value of nonparticipation. Likewise, participants decide to leave the 
labor force if the value of nonparticipation is greater than the value of 
participation. More people will participate in the labor force if the value of 
participation increases. The number of participants in the labor force is the 
number of persons with a value of nonparticipation that is equal to or lower 
than the value of participation. Variables that increase the value of participation 
will increase the participation rate, and variables that increase the value of 
nonparticipation will decrease the participation rate.  
Labor force participants could be employed, openly unemployed, or partici-
pating in a labor market program. Figure 1 describes the states and flows in the 











Figure 1. The state and flows in the labor market for labor force participants 
 
φ  represents exogenously given negative shocks to the firms that result in 
decreased regular employment. A fraction (1−µ) of the number of persons that 
is separated from a job become unemployed, and a fraction µ is placed in a IFAU – Do labor market programs affect labor force participation?  9
program
1. The probability of getting a place in a program if openly unemployed 
is γ, and the probability of being unemployed after program participation is λ.  
The firms are opening vacancies, and the openly unemployed and partici-
pants in labor market programs search for vacant jobs. Vacant jobs and search-
ers are matched, and the number of matches depends on the number of search-
ers and the number of vacancies. The probability of getting a job offer, α, in-
creases with the number of vacant jobs and decreases with the number of 
searchers, that is, the number of openly unemployed and participants in labor 
market programs.  
The probability of getting a job differs between the unemployed and the par-
ticipants in labor market programs; the c parameter captures this difference. If c 
is greater than one, labor market programs have positive effects on the job-
offer probability for the program participants compared to the openly unem-
ployed. If c is less than one, program participants have smaller chances of get-
ting a job offer than the openly unemployed. One reason could be that the pro-
gram participants search less than openly unemployed.  
The value of labor force participation could be computed as the discounted 
income in each state (employment, program participation, and unemployment) 
– accounting for the probability of changing state and income in the new state. 
The value of labor force participation depends on wages, w, the job-offer prob-
ability, α, policy parameters that describe the flow into and out of labor market 
programs, λ, γ, and µ, the replacement ratios ρr, and ρu, the job separation rate, 
φ, the discount factor, δ, and on the c parameter that reflects relative effective-
ness of the programs. The effect on the participation rate is the same as the ef-
fect on the value of labor force participation.  
Table 1 displays effects on participation rate from changes in the above 
model’s variables.  
                                                      
1 It is possible to go directly from regular employment to a program. This is so because some-
times only a short period of unemployment was required to be eligible to participate in a pro-
gram. IFAU – Do labor market programs affect labor force participation?   10
 
Table 1. Effects on the labor force participation rate 
Change in    Effect 
w  wage + 
v  vacancies + 
u  open unemployment  - 
r  participants in labor market programs   + 
φ  negative employment shocks  - 
ρu, ρr  level of unemployment benefits  + 
 
An increase in wages, w, increases the value of participation and thus in-
creases the labor force participation rate.  
The value of being employed is higher than the value of being unemployed 
or in a program. So the value of labor force participation is increased if it is 
easy to find a job. An increased number of vacancies, v, increases the probabil-
ity of finding a job and is expected to have a positive effect on labor force par-
ticipation. An increased number of openly unemployed, u, increases the num-
ber of persons searching for jobs, and for a given number of vacancies, it is 
more difficult to find a job. So an increase in open unemployment is expected 
to have a negative effect on the labor force participation rate.  
The number of participants in labor market programs, r, which in the model 
is formulated in terms of flows, is expected to have a positive effect on labor 
force participation, since participating in a program is better than, or at least as 
good as, being openly unemployed. It will be better to participate in a program 
than to be openly unemployed if obtained benefits are higher when in a pro-
gram than when openly unemployed. This has been the case for some pro-
grams. Often, participants in job creation programs are paid more than the un-
employment benefit, while participants in training programs receive the unem-
ployment benefit. And the labor force participation rate is expected to increase 
if programs become more effective so that the program increases the job-offer 
probability. Furthermore, if programs are used to qualify for new periods of 
unemployment benefits, the value of labor force participation is also increased. 
These direct effects of programs are positive. There will also be an indirect 
negative effect from labor market programs. An increased number of partici-
pants in programs increases the number of job-searchers for a given number of 
vacancies and openly unemployed. This is expected to decrease the labor force 
participation rate because the probability of getting a job decreases. The last IFAU – Do labor market programs affect labor force participation?  11
negative indirect effect is probably small, so that direct, positive effects of pro-
grams will dominate.  
An increased number of negative employment shocks, φ, increases the 
probability of being openly unemployed. This is expected to have a negative 
effect on the labor force participation rate because the probability of getting a 
lower income has increased because unemployment benefits are lower than 
wages.  
ρu and ρr are the replacement ratios, which are the proportion of income 
that is obtained when openly unemployed or participating in a program. An in-
creased level of unemployment benefits is expected to increase the labor force 
participation rate in the same way as increased wages.  
To summarize, we would expect that higher wages, an increased number of 
vacancies, an increased number of labor market programs participants, and a 
higher level of unemployment benefits positively affect the labor force partici-
pation rate. Increased unemployment and negative employment shocks are ex-





The previous section concludes that these variables should affect the participa-
tion rate: wages, vacancies, open unemployment, the number of labor market 
programs, negative employment shocks, and unemployment benefits.  
 
3.1 The data set 
The data set is a panel consisting of yearly observations from 1986 to 1998 for 
Sweden’s municipalities. Employment, population by age, and annual labor in-
come are obtained from Statistics Sweden. Observations on employment are 
November figures, based on a register called RAMS. Data on the number of 
persons unemployed and in labor market programs in November is obtained 
from the National Labor Market Board (Ams). Data on employment at the 
plant level, used to calculate the job destruction rate, are obtained from a data-
base at IFAU. 
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3.2 Definition of variables 
The number of persons in the labor force is calculated as the sum (using two 
different data sources) of the number of persons employed, unemployed, and in 
labor market programs. Nonparticipants are the working-age population, ages 
18-65, excluding those in the labor force. With this definition, all participants 
in labor market programs are in the labor force
2.  
The wage, w, is measured by the real average annual labor income, for those 
employed, in each municipality.  
Unemployment, u, is measured as the number of unemployed who are regis-
tered at an employment office.  
The number of vacancies, v, is measured by the total number of vacancies 
reported to the labor market office. The empirical measure of the number of 
vacancies covers only a part of the total number of vacancies.  
The number of labor market program participants, r, is measured as the total 
number of persons in labor market programs, excluding participants in pro-
grams directed toward people with disabilities. The number of participants in 
labor market programs measures two effects: (1) a direct positive effect be-
cause the value of labor market participation increases with the number of per-
sons in programs; and (2) an indirect negative effect through job-offer 
probability, whereby an increased number of participants in labor market 
programs will increase the number of searchers, which will have a negative 
competition effect for a given number of vacancies.  
The negative shock to employment, φ, is measured by the job destruction 
rate. The job destruction is defined as the absolute sum of negative employ-
ment changes in the plants in each municipality. The job destruction rate is cal-
culated as the job destruction divided by the average employment at each plant 
in period t and t−1.  
Data on the level of unemployment benefits (ρr and ρu) are not available at 
the municipality level. So time dummies in the estimation capture the effect of 
unemployment benefits.  
Some demographic variables are also included in the estimations. These 
variables are the number of persons between ages 18-24 and 55-65, in relation 
to the number of persons in the working-age population, ages 18-65. These age 
groups have lower participation rates than the average, which reflects the large 
                                                      
2 This is a difference compared to the labor force surveys, where participants in some programs 
are defined as students and thus outside the labor force. IFAU – Do labor market programs affect labor force participation?  13
number of students among the younger group and that the likelihood of early 




4 Empirical results 
The labor force participation rate is the dependent variable in the estimation, 
and it is allowed to be affected by wages, the number of vacancies, open unem-
ployment, the number of labor market program participants, the job destruction 
rate and the number of persons between 18-24 and 55-65 year. The labor force, 
vacancies, unemployment, and the number of persons in labor market programs 
are divided by the lagged number of persons in the working-age population – to 
account for the fact that the explanatory variables could affect migration be-
tween the municipalities. For example, if the number of vacancies increases 
both labor force and population, the estimated effect on the participation rate 
will be lower than the effect on labor force, because population is also in-
creased. If migration is affected, the estimated coefficients will be a mixture of 
two effects when the variables are divided by the current population, since both 
the numerator and the denominator of the dependent variable will be affected. 
The demographic variables are divided by the current working-age population, 
and they are included as lagged one period. All variables are measured in No-
vember each year. Table 2 summarizes definitions of the variables in the esti-
mations.  
 
Table 2. Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
lf  no. of persons in the labor force / pop.1865t-1 
w  average annual income for employed 
v  no. of vacancies / pop.1865t-1 
u  no. of unemployed / pop.1865t-1 
r  no. of persons in labor market programs / pop1865t-1 
jdr  job destruction rate 
p1824  no. of persons ages 18-24t-1 / pop.1865t-1 
p5565  no. of persons ages 55-65t-1 / pop.1865t-1 
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Lagged variables are included in the estimation to allow for time to adjust 
labor force participation. The dynamic panel data model that should be esti-
mated takes this form:  
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where ki is an unobserved municipality specific effect, and kt is a time-varying 
aggregate effect. The model is differenced before estimation, allowing all vari-
ables to be correlated with the unobserved municipality-specific fixed effect, ki.  
The GMM estimator for dynamic panel data models suggested by Arellano 
and Bond (1991) is used in the estimation. The demographic variables are as-
sumed to be exogenously determined. The economic variables are endoge-
nously determined, mainly through the definition of labor force as the sum of 
employed, openly unemployed and participants in labor market programs.  
Lagged economic variables and current and lagged demographic variables 
are used as instruments in the estimation. Actually, the rules for how Sweden’s 
Labor Market Board allocates money to the local level imply that lagged un-
employment and lagged number of program participants affect spending on la-
bor market programs; see the discussion in Dahlberg and Forslund (1999). So 
use of lagged variables as instruments for the coefficients on the policy variable 
(number of participants in labor market programs) is justified by the allocation 
of spending. One extra instrument that captures municipality-specific employ-
ment shocks is used in the estimation. The extra instrument is calculated by ap-
plying the average aggregate change in employment at each two-digit industry 
level, on each industry share of employment in each municipality, lagged two 
periods.  
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4.1 Estimation results 
First, a preliminary model, in which all variables are included with two lags, 
was estimated. Insignificant variables, at the 10% level, were then deleted from 
the preliminary model. Table 3 displays the estimation results
3.  
First we can note that the Sargan statistic and the correlation tests accept the 
model and that the estimated coefficients are almost the same in the first- and 
second-step estimation. The second lag of the dependent variable is not signifi-
cant, but it is included because otherwise the AR(2) test indicates serial correla-
tion. The estimated adjustment coefficient is 0.59.  
As expected, the effect of income is positive. The number of vacancies en-
ters lagged one period, and as expected, the effect is positive. The estimated 
contemporaneous coefficient on unemployment is positive, and the lagged co-
efficients are negative. According to the theoretical model, the effect of unem-
ployment is expected to be negative. One major unemployment shock is domi-
nant during the sample period and it turns out that the time dummies in the es-
timation partly capture this common shock
4. If the model is estimated without 
the time dummies, the coefficients on unemployment are affected. It seems to 
be the case that the time dummies somewhat capture a common unemployment 
shock, so the estimated coefficients on unemployment can not be interpreted as 
the effect of unemployment. It is not possible to obtain a reasonable empirical 
model without the significant time dummies. So the size of the discouraged-
worker effect can not be determined empirically. The discouraged-worker ef-
fect is present in the data, because vacancies and unemployment affect the par-
ticipation rate, but it is not possible to measure the size of the discouraged-
worker effect. The immediate effect of the number of participants in labor mar-
ket programs is positive, the lagged effect is negative, and the long-run effect is 
positive, as expected. . The immediate and lagged effects of the job destruction 
                                                      
3 The standard errors and the p-values for the second-step estimation are calculated using the 
small sample correction suggested by Windmeijer (2000). The differences between the first- and 
the second- step parameter estimates and standard errors are very small. Time dummies and a 
constant are included in the estimations. The instrument matrix contains the endogenous vari-
ables at time t-2 up to t-4, the exogenous demographic variables at t up to t-4, and the municipal-
ity specific shock at t. The DPD package for Ox is used in the estimation, see Doornik, Arellano, 
and Bond (2001). The correlation tests are the m1 and m2 statistics, suggested in Arellano and 
Bond (1991). The differencing of the model, due to the fixed effect, will introduce a moving av-
erage error. So the AR(1) test should indicate correlation, while the AR(2) test should not. It is 
assumed that the level equation has serially uncorrelated errors. 
4 The time dummies capture all variation in data that is common for the municipalities. IFAU – Do labor market programs affect labor force participation?   16
 
Table 3. Estimation results  
  First step estimation  Second step estimation 
Variable  Coeff p-val SE Coeff p-val SE 
lft-1  0.362 0.000 0.039 0.361 0.000 0.039 
lft-2  0.035 0.114 0.022 0.035 0.137 0.023 
wt  0.004 0.071 0.002 0.004 0.083 0.002 
vt-1  0.177 0.032 0.082 0.176 0.042 0.086 
ut  0.487 0.000 0.059 0.483 0.000 0.058 
ut-1  -0.549 0.000 0.053 -0.547 0.000 0.056 
ut-2  -0.153 0.000 0.042 -0.138 0.002 0.044 
rt  0.624 0.000 0.066 0.634 0.000 0.069 
rt-1  -0.214 0.000 0.058 -0.212 0.000 0.059 
jdrt  -0.121 0.000 0.021 -0.121 0.000 0.021 
jdrt-1  -0.012 0.046 0.006 -0.012 0.042 0.006 
p1824t  -0.417 0.000 0.056 -0.409 0.000 0.057 
p5565t  -0.158 0.001 0.049 -0.150 0.002 0.049 
const  -0.005 0.000 0.001 -0.004 0.000 0.001 
t1990  -0.002 0.215 0.002 -0.002 0.256 0.002 
t1991  -0.020 0.000 0.002 -0.021 0.000 0.002 
t1992  -0.008 0.006 0.003 -0.009 0.007 0.003 
t1993  -0.024 0.000 0.003 -0.025 0.000 0.003 
t1994  0.029 0.000 0.003 0.029 0.000 0.003 
t1995  0.008 0.000 0.002 0.007 0.002 0.002 
t1996  -0.005 0.000 0.001 -0.006 0.000 0.001 
t1997  -0.007 0.000 0.002 -0.007 0.000 0.002 
t1998  0.011 0.000 0.002 0.011 0.000 0.002 
Sargan  743.0 0.000 268.6 0.343  
AR(1)  -10.46 0.000 -8.10 0.000  
AR(2)  2.38 0.018 1.55 0.122  
 
rate are negative, as expected. And the effect of the demographic variables, the 
proportion of persons ages 18-24 and 55-65 are negative, as expected. IFAU – Do labor market programs affect labor force participation?  17
Table 4. Immediate and long-run effects 
Variable Immediate Long  run 
w  0.004  [ 0.008   0.002] 0.007  [ 0.012   0.003] 
v  - 0.291  [ 0.526   0.056] 
u  0.483  [ 0.579   0.388] -0.332  [-0.013 –0.677] 
r  0.634  [ 0.747   0.521] 0.699  [ 1.081   0.317] 
jdr  -0.121  [-0.087 –0.155] -0.219  [ 0.162 –0.601] 
p1824  -0.401  [-0.316 –0.502] -0.676  [-0.265 –1.087] 
p5565  -0.150  [-0.069 –0.230] -0.247  [ 0.225 –0.720] 
 
Table 4 presents the immediate and long-term effects, together with 90% 
confidence intervals
5. The effect of income is positive and significant in the 
short and long run. The long- term effect of income corresponds to an income 
elasticity of 0.049. The long-term effect of the number of vacancies is signifi-
cantly different from zero. The point estimate indicates that if the number of 
vacancies is permanently increased by 100, the number of participants in the 
labor force increases by 29 persons in the long run. The estimated long-run co-
efficient on unemployment is negative (-0.33), but it does not measure the total 
effect of unemployment. The estimated long-term effect of labor market pro-
grams is slightly higher than the immediate effect. If the number of participants 
in labor market programs is increased permanently by 100, the labor force in-
creases immediately by 63 persons and by 70 persons in the long run. The es-
timation results indicate that labor market programs are reducing the business-
cycle variation in the labor force, because the effect is positive and programs 
are counter-cyclical, that is, they tend to be increased when unemployment is 
high. The long-term effect of an increased number of persons in programs is 
positive, which means that labor force participants who would have left the la-
bor force in absence of programs are now participating because of the pro-
grams. The estimation results suggest that if the number of labor market pro-
gram participants is permanently increased, it will have a relatively large effect 
on labor force participation. The immediate negative effect of the job destruc-
tion rate is smaller than the long-run effect, -0.12 compared to -0.22. If the 
number of destroyed jobs is increased with 100, 22 persons will leave the labor 
force in the long run. The long-run effect of the job destruction rate is not sig-
                                                      
5 The calculation is based on the adjusted standard errors in the second step estimation. IFAU – Do labor market programs affect labor force participation?   18
nificantly different from zero. And the long-run effects of the demographic 
variables are negative and larger than short-run effects. The long-run effect of 
the proportion of 55 to 65 years old is not significantly different from zero, 
while the long-run effect of the proportion of 18 to 24 years old is significant.  
To summarize, the estimated long-run effects are of the expected signs, and 
the largest effects are found for labor market programs and the proportion of 
persons between ages 18 and 24. The changes in the estimated coefficients are 
small if the variables are divided by the current population instead of the 
lagged population. The changes in the estimated coefficients indicate that 
wages, vacancies, and programs increase the municipal population and that un-
employment and job destruction decrease the municipal population. The esti-
mation results are not sensible to exclusion of the largest and smallest munici-
palities. And the results do not change if the model is estimated allowing the 
errors to be correlated between municipalities in the same labor market region. 
The estimation results also imply an indirectly estimated displacement ef-
fect. If open unemployment is held constant, and labor market programs in-
crease by 100, the labor force increases immediately by 63 persons, according 
to the estimated coefficient. Then, regular employment must decrease by 37 
persons, implying a short-run displacement effect of 0.37. In the long run, the 
implied displacement effect is 0.30. Dahlberg and Forslund (1999) estimate 
immediate, direct, displacement effects to be about 0.65 and the long-run effect 
to be around 0.75 for programs with subsidized employment. They also found 
that the displacement effect of training programs is insignificant, which could 
partly explain the difference, because training programs are included in the 
measure of labor market programs that is used in this study. This comparison 
relies on the assumption that labor market programs do not affect open unem-
ployment.  
 
Table 5. Immediate and long-run elasticities 
Variable Immediate Long  run 
w  0.030 0.049 
v  -0 . 0 0 3  
u  0.029 -0.020 
r  0.019 0.021 
jdr  -0.016 -0.029 
p1824  -0.073 -0.121 
p5565  -0.032 -0.052 IFAU – Do labor market programs affect labor force participation?  19
 
In Table 5, the estimates are converted into elasticities, evaluated at the 
mean of the variables. In general, the estimated elasticities are small and at the 
same time, the average percentage change in the labor force participation rate is 
small, -0.6%.  
To illustrate the sizes of the estimated effects, an experiment is carried out, 
where the variables are increased permanently with one standard deviation. A 
one standard deviation shock is selected because it measures the size of a typi-
cal shock during the sample period. In the experiment, employment and the 
number of persons in the working-age population are assumed to be constant. 
 
Table 6. Effects of changes with one standard deviation 
Variable Immediate Long  run 
w (9%)  12 196 20 226 
v (46%)  - 6 752 
u (53%)  70 333 -48 295 
r (50%)  43 325 47 744 
jdr (20%)  -14 195 -25 755 
p1824 (4%)  -14 439 -23 883 
p5565 (3%)  -4 461 -7 366 
 
From Table 6, we can note that the standard deviations are low for the popu-
lation ratios, implying that ''normal'' shocks are relatively small. The standard 
deviations for the number of vacancies, unemployment, and labor market pro-
grams are around 50%, which reflect the huge increase in unemployment dur-
ing the early 1990s. The variation in the job destruction rate and income are 
about 20 and 10%, respectively. Results from the experiment indicate that in 
the long run, the labor market programs and unemployment have about the 
same effect but with different signs. Even though the estimated coefficients on 
open unemployment do not measure the total effect of unemployment, results 
from the experiment indicate that the programs could offset a permanent in-
crease in open unemployment. The effects of the job destruction rate, the num-
ber of young people, and income are also about the same size.  
 
4.2 Comparison with other studies 
Large effects from labor market programs are also found in other studies. 
Dahlberg and Forslund (1999) use the same data set as in this study but with a IFAU – Do labor market programs affect labor force participation?   20
shorter sample period. In their estimation, the implied short-run effect on labor 
force participation from labor market programs is about 0.60, which is about 
the same magnitude as results obtained here. The estimates in Johansson and 
Markowski (1995), who use Swedish time series data between 1970-92, indi-
cate that a 50% increase of the number of participants in labor market programs 
causes an immediate
6 increase in the labor force with 27 300 persons, evaluated 
at the mean of the sample used here. The effect is smaller than the one obtained 
here (43 000 persons); see Table 6. Wadensjö (1993) obtains the result that a 
1% increase in labor market programs increases the labor force with slightly 
more than 1%. This effect is much larger than the results obtained here, where 
long-run elasticity is estimated to 0.02; see Table 5. He notes that the sizes of 




5 Discussion of the results 
The estimated coefficients on labor market programs suggest that they have 
relatively large, positive, long- and short-run effects on the participation rate. 
The positive effects from programs are robust against different specifications, 
different choices of the instrument matrix, and different estimation methods
7.  
The positive effects on the labor force participation rate indicate that labor 
market programs reduce business-cycle variation in labor force participation 
because programs are counter-cyclical. A permanent increase in the number of 
persons in labor market programs during a downturn in the economy prevents 
people from dropping out of the labor force, because participants who would 
have left the labor force in the absence of programs are now participating be-
cause of the programs.  
In practice, labor market programs have been used to qualify unemployed 
for new periods of unemployment benefits, which causes difficulties in inter-
preting estimation results. The true effect of labor market programs on the ef-
fective labor force is probably less than the estimated coefficients indicate, be-
cause we do not know the extent of dropouts in absence of labor market pro-
                                                      
6 The long-run effect from labor market programs is restricted to zero in the estimation. 
7 The model was also estimated with the estimator suggested by Blundell and Bond (1998). IFAU – Do labor market programs affect labor force participation?  21
grams used for renewal of benefits periods
8. And it should be pointed out that 
the estimation results do not measure the effect of programs on the effective la-
bor force, because we do not know if labor force participants, who chose to re-
main in the labor force because of labor market programs, search for jobs to the 
same extent as other labor force participants. If they search less, the effect on 
the effective labor force will be smaller than the estimated coefficients indicate. 
Furthermore, the estimated coefficients measure the partial effects on the labor 
supply, so it is impossible to conclude that an increased number of labor market 
programs is an effective way to increase labor force participation. For this to be 
done, programs’ costs, for example, must be accounted for.  
Unfortunately, it is not possible to empirically determine the size of the dis-
couraged-worker effect because the time dummies capture part of the common 
unemployment shock, so the coefficients on open unemployment do not meas-
ure the total effect of unemployment. Therefore, effects from an experiment, 
where persons are moved from open unemployment to labor market programs, 
could not be computed.  
Because labor force participation is increasing in labor market programs 
participation, the bookkeeping relationship between employment, unemploy-
ment, labor market programs, and labor force should not be used when fore-
casting the labor market situation. For example, political targets for open un-
employment, which have been used in Sweden, are harder to reach by increas-
ing the number of labor market programs because open unemployment is not 
reduced by the same amount.  
                                                      
8 Benefits from unemployment insurance are larger than the social allowance. IFAU – Do labor market programs affect labor force participation?   22
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